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PRESUMPTIONS AFFECTING THE RECOVERY OF
PREFERENCES BY TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY
FOWLER VINCENT HARPER*

The many vexatious questions arising in a trustee's suit
to recover property of the bankrupt which has been conveyed
contrary to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act will fall under
one or more of three sections of the statute. The transaction
may be avoided under section 67e if it be one made with the
intent to hinder, delay and defraud creditors. This involves
the rules of the common law of fraud which have developed
under statute 13 Elizabeth, c. 5.' Again the question of fraud
may be raised by the trustee basing a recovery under section
70e, under which the statutory modifications of the particular
state may be invoked.2 The state law of fraud may likewise be
raised under the second paragraph of section 67e, but because
of the time limitation, section 70e is usually relied upon instead.' But even if there be no fraud, actual or constructive,
according to the immemorial law or by modern statutory provisions, the trustee may, in some instances, recover property
the transfer of which has resulted in giving to one creditor a
preference over others of the same class. Sections 60a and
60b provide for this situation.
It will be seen that actions based upon fraud are not peculiar to bankruptcy law for the statute merely allows the
trustee to avoid transfers void or voidable at the common law or
under the state law. The clause pertaining to preferences, however, raises questions characteristic of bankruptcy law and the
solution of these problems constitutes a considerable bulk of
bankruptcy litigation.
The general requirements for the trustee to fulfill before he
can avoid a preference are easily enough stated and comprehended. The manner in which he can satisfy these requirements, however, is not so simple. A great deal of the difficulty
lies in the nature and extent of prioof required to show the elements of a preference. It is with the presumptions affecting
of Law, School of Law, University of North Dakota.]
'See GILBERT, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (1927) 1018; cf. ibid. 85.
'*[Professor

2See Dodd v. Raines, 1 Fed. (2d) 658 (D. C. Ga. 1924); See BLAcK, BANK.
RUPTCY (4th ed.) 1199; cf. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY (9th ed.) 952.
'See COLLIER, op. cit. supra note 2, at 957.
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this proof and the extent of their effect that this study is concerned.
Section 60b provides as follows:
"If a bankrupt shall have procured or suffered a judgment
to be entered against him in favor of any person or have made
a transfer of any of his property, and if, at the time of the
transfer, or of the entry of the judgment . . . and being with-

in four months of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy or
after the filing thereof and before adjudication, the bankrupt
be insolvent and the judgment or transfer then operate as a
preference, and the person receiving it or to be benefited thereby, or his agent acting therein, shall then have reasonable cause
to believe that the enforcement of such judgment or transfer
would effect a preference, it shall be voidable by the trustee
and h may recover the property or its value from such person...
It is thus seen that a voidable preference must consist of

several elements among which are the following: (1) the bankrupt's estate must have been depleted; (2) the transfer must
enable the transferee to obtain a greater percentage of his claim
than other creditors of the same class; (3) the transfer must
have been made within four months; (4) the transfer must
have been made while the debtor was insolvent; (5) the person
receiving the property or assets or the person to be benefited
thereby must have had reasonable cause to believe that a preference would be effected.'
It is obvious that there will have been no preference unless
the payment was out of the bankrupt's estate. The depletion
of the estate is the test to be employed.' The burden of proof
is here upon the trustee, and he must sustain the burden of
proving that money or property which rightfully belongs to all
the creditors was transferred to the preferred creditor,' or for
his benefit, for mere circuity of arrangement as to the transfer
will not relieve it of its preferential character.' Likewise, the
burden of proof is upon the trustee to show that the creditor
4
Re Shaw, 7 Fed. (2d) 381 (D. C. N. 3. 1925); Wolf Mfg. Co. v. Battreal
Shoe Co., 192 Mo. App. 113, 180 S.W. 396 (1915); Kimmerle v. Farr, 189 Fed.

295 5(C. C. A. 6th, 1911)'. See also GILBERT, Op. cit. supra note 1, at 815.
Lowell v. Brown, 280 Fed. 193 (D. C. Mass. 1922).
6

,' Miller v. Fisk Tire Co., 11 Fed. (2d) 301 (D. C. Minn. 1926).

7Newport Bank v. Herkimer Bank, 225 U. S. 178, 32 Sup. Ct. 633 (1912);

Miller v. Fisk Tire Co., supra note 6.
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receives, by reason of the transfer or payment, a greater percentage of his claim than other creditors of the same class.'
Not all preferences are voidable for there is nothing inherently wrong about a preference. The law invalidating them
is dependent upon the extent to which public policy demands
an equitable distribution of a debtor's assets among all his creditors. Hence preferences must be distinguished from fraud.'
The latter may always be avoided by the trustee, the former
only when prohibited by the Bankruptcy Act. In other words,
the two sections, supra, pertaining to fraud, prohibit all fraudulent transfers, while the section allowing the trustee to recover
preferential payments or transfers specifically designates certain ones only as voidable.
Consequently the trustee cannot attack transfers as preferences within the prohibition of section 60b unless they occurred
within the four months limitation,"0 and the burden of proof
is upon the trustee to establish such fact. 1 He may be able to
recover the property under some section of the Act, namely
70e, as a fraudulent conveyance, if the transfer occurred prior
to the four months period, but not because it amounts to a preference. Since the presumption favors the validity of the payment
of a valid debt, even if the trustee shows all the other elements
of a voidable preference, he must still show, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that it took place not before the next preceding
four months from the filing of the petition in bankruptcy.
SRe
Shaw, supra note 4.
9

For discussion of distinctions between fraudulent and preferential transfers,
see Van Iderstine v. Nat. Discount Co., 174 Fed. 518 (C. C. A. 2d 1909), aIJ'd,

227 U. S. 575, 33 Sup. Ct. 343 (1913); Coder v. Arts, 213 U. S. 223, 29 Sup.
Ct. 436
(1909).
0

In re East End Mantel & Tile Co., 202 Fed. 275 (W. D. Pa. 1913) ; Jack-

son v. Sedgwick, 189 Fed. 508 (C. C. N. Y. 1911). The case of transfers such
as mortgages, which were made prior to the four months period, but which were
registered or recorded within that period, should be noted. Since the 1910
amendment to section 60b, the validity of the mortgage is to be judged as of
the time of the recording, rather than of the time of execution, where such
recording is required. Davis v. Savings Society, 210 Fed. 768 (C. C. A. 4th,
1913)'; WILUSTON, CASES ON BANKRUPTCY (2d ed. 1913) 277; In re Bunch
Commission Co., 225 Fed. 243 (D. C. Ark. 1915). Since the 1926 amendment
to section 60a, adding the words "or permitted" after the word "required", the
four months period runs from the time of the recording in an increased number
of cases. See R. F. Colin, An Analysis of the 1926 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act (1926) 26 Col. L. REV. 789, 801. See also GILBERT, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 824, 825.
"The four months limitation is one of the "elements" of a voidable preference which the trustee is bound to show. See GILBERT, Op. cit. supra note 1, at

817.
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The bankrupt must be insolvent at the time of the transfer
complained of. Even though he was insolvent shortly after,
there can be no preference if, at the time, he was, in fact, solvent. The fact that the bankrupt might have become insolvent
within four months of the filing of the petition is of no significance providing it was subsequent to the transfer, for insolvency
must be determined solely as of the time of such transfer."
This is consistent with the definition of a preference that it be
a transfer or conveyance which will "enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other
of such creditors of the same class." 1
Insolvency, as contemplated by the bankruptcy law, means
that the aggregate of the bankrupt's property and assets is not
The mere
sufficient, at a fair evaluation, to meet liabilities.'
fact that he is unable to meet his bills as they fall due, 5 or
that he is embarrassed,"6 is not sufficient for the Act contemplates insolvency in but one sense, namely, liabilities in excess
It has been held that, although the definition of
of assets.'
insolvency found in the Bankruptcy Act must control in the federal courts, the state rule will be followed where the proceeding is one in a state court to determine whether a transfer of a
This, however, is not the
debtor is a preferential one or not.'
' 2Hicks Co. Ltd. v. Moore, 261 Fed. 773 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919); Matter of
Looschen Piano Case Co., 259 Fed. 931 (D. C. N. J. 1919); Re Keller, 252 Fed.
942 (E.D. Mich. 1918); Re Leach, 171 Fed. 622 (C. C. A. 6th, 1909).
23 See Bankruptcy Act, § 60a.
14See Bankruptcy Act, § 1 (15). A "fair evaluation" includes a business
as a "going concern", and not as mere dead property after bankruptcy has intervened. In re Klein, 197 Fed. 241 (C. C. A. 6th, 1912). But the assets do
not include property transfered in fraud of creditors. Utah Association of Credit
Men v. Boyle Furniture Co., 39 Utah, 518, 117 Pac. 800 (1911).
"sNewman v. Tootle-Campbell Dry Goods Co., 174 Mo. App. 528, 160 S. W.
Consistent with this, knowledge by a creditor that the bankrupt
825 (1913).
failed to meet his obligations promptly is not sufficient notice as a mater of law
to put him on inquiry. Ark. Nat. Bank v. Sparks, 83 Ark. 324, 103 S. W. 626

(1907).
6In re Chappell, 113 Fed. 545 (D. C. Va. 1901). Consistent with this,
knowledge by a creditor that the bankrupt was financially embarrassed is not
sufficient notice. Re Wolf Co., 164 Fed. 448 (D. C. Pa. 1908). The fact that
a corporation engaged in the performance of a contract which required a considerable expenditure before it was entitled to payment thereunder arranged with
a bank for making overdrafts is no evidence that it was insolvent at the time
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. McDonald v. Clearwater Shortline
R. Co., 164 Fed. 1007 (C. C. Idaho, 1908).
17 Ogden v. Redish, 200 Fed. 977 (D. C. Ky. 1912).
"8Simpson v. Western Hardware & Metal Co., 97 Wash. 626, 167 Pac. 113
(1917).
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law in California19 and is clearly opposed to the weight of authority."
The burden of proof to show insolvency at the time of the
alleged preferential transfer is upon the trustee." He must
make it appear affirmatively that insolvency existed at that
time. In the case of a transfer, required or permitted by law
to be registered or recorded," the transferor must have been
insolvent at the date on which it was filed for record.
It has
been recently held that where it appears that the debtor's assets,
at the time of the transfer, were not sufficiently marketable to
pay its debts and the refusal of all of the creditors to extend
time for the payments of debts would necessitate a suspension
of operations, there is sufficient evidence of insolvency to sustain the trustee's burden of proof. " Where the bankrupt is
a partnership, the trustee has the burden of proving not only
that the firm, but also that all of the partners were insolvent at
the time of the transfer.
In trustees' actions to recover preferences, the bankrupt's
books are admissible upon the issue of insolvency at a particular time,2 as are also his papers connected with the business.2
So also the bankruptcy record is admissible showing the bank.
rupt's petition, schedules, appraisal of estate and the list of
creditors, together with the bankrupt's testimony as to the correctness of the schedules and lists. 2 Evidence that the bank.
rupt was reputed in the community to be insolvent at the date
of the transfer has been held admissible. 8
1"Summerville v. Stockton Milling Co., 142 Cal. 529, 76 Pac. 243 (1904).
2
oSee cases cited in GILBERT, op. cit supra note 1, at 816, n. 32.
21
Doyle Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 5 Fed. (2d) 918 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925);

Re Shaw, 7 Fed. (2) 381 (D. C. N. J. 1925); Manley v. Southern Supply Co.,
Re Burgess, 14 Fed. (2d) 273 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926); Re Gaylord, 225 Fed. 234

(1915);
Re Carlile, 199 Fed. 612 (D. C. N. C. 1912).
22
See supra note 10.

2
8McElvain
2

v. Hardesty, 169 Fed. 31 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909).
3aGates v. First Nat. Bank of Richmond, 1 Fed. (2d) 820 (D. C. Va. 1924).

24

Crancer & Co. v. Wade, 26 Okla. 757, 110 Pac. 778 (1910).
25
Ernst v. Mechanics etc. Bank of N. Y., 200 Fed. 295 (D. C. N,. Y.
26
Grandison v. Nat. Bank of Commerce, 220 Fed. 981 (D. C. N. Y.
27

Lynch v. Bronson, 80 Conn. 566, 69 Atl. 538 (1908)'.

1911).
1915).
But see Batchelder

v. Home Nat. Bank of Milford, 218 Mass. 420, 105 N. E. 1052 (1914). See
Buttz2 8v. James, 33 N. D. 162, 156 N. W. 547 (1916).
First Nat'l Bank of Maysville v. Alexander, 49 Okla. 418, 153 Pac. 646
(1915). The trustee can also show the common report that the bankrupt, immediately before the.transfer, contemplated bankruptcy or was about to go into
bankruptcy on account of insolvency, for the purpose of charging the creditor
with notice. McAleer v. People's Bank, 202 Ala. 256, 80 So. 94 (1918).
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It is said, however, that there may be a presumption to aid
the trustee in sustaining his burden of proof to show a preference prohibited by law. There may be circumstances which
raise a presumption that transfers amounted to a preference.
If there be any such presumption, how does it affect proof of
insolvency?
Many authorities insist that the mere fact that the debtor
was afterwards adjudged bankrupt raises no presumption that
he was insolvent at any time within the four months prior to
the petition in bankruptcy. 9 Thus it has been said, "it [the
bankrupt] was adjudicated a bankrupt on its admission of insolvency and willingness to be adjudicated a bankrupt; but
such admission and adjudication speak only as of the time when
made, and are not available to prove insolvency at an earlier
period."3 In a recent case, however, it was said that "when
a corporation is adjudged bankrupt it is, of course, presumed
under both the federal and the state law that it was insolvent
for four months preceding the adjudication."'" In Re Dix, the
federal court maintained that where the undisputed facts established that the bankrupt was insolvent to a large extent at the
time of bankruptcy, there was prima facie proof that he was
insolvent at the time of the preference, about a month before."
If a presumption arises, under such circumstances, the practical question is: What is the force and effect of the same?
It is not easy to determine from Re Dix. The question arose on
the review of an order of the referee based upon the proposition
that there was no evidence of insolvency. Judge Learned Hand,
in reversing the order, stated, "The proof of insolvency was
sufficient. [After reviewing the undisputed facts.] In view
of the fact that no dispute as to his insolvency appears in the
testimony or in the briefs, this is sufficient prima facie proof
29

McNeel v. Folk, 75 W. Va. 57, 83 S. E. 192 (1914); Kimball v. Dresser,
98 Me. 519, 57 AtI. 787 (1904); Swartz v. Frank, 183 Mo. 438, 82 S. W. 60
(1904) ; In re Chappell, 113 Fed. 545 (D. C. Va. 1901). See BLACK, op. Cit. supra
note 2, at 1344.
30
Re Looschen Piano Case Co., 259 Fed. 931, 934 (D. C. N. J. 1919).
31
Hoppe v. First Nat. Bank, 137 Wash. 41, 241 Pac. 662 (1925). But see
the same court, the same judge, in Simpson v. Western Hardware & Metal Co.,

97 Wash. 626, 167 Pac. 113 (1917).
32

1n re Dix, 267 Fed. 1016 (D. C. N. Y. 1920).
See BLACK, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 1344. In this case, it seems that there was no "going business" involved, the value of which might substantially affect the question of insolvency

at any given time.
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of insolvency on June 1 and 2, 1912.""s It must be remembered that the only proof of insolvency at the date of the transaction was the fact that one month later, the bankrupt was hopelessly insolvent. This looks as if a genuine presumption was
raised throwing upon the transferee the burden of showing that
there was no insolvency, or at least casting upon him the burden
of coming forward with some evidence to that effect, in the
absence of which a finding of insolvency will be and must necessarily be made.
But this is not certain because of the peculiar relation which
the referee in bankruptcy has to the district court. The findings of the referee, it is true, are ordinarily presumed to be
correct until the contrary is shown, " and his position and duties
are said to be analogous to those of a special master, directed
to take evidence and to report his conclusions. 5 Still, if the
findings are but inferences from established, admitted or undisputed, or stipulated facts, his conclusions need carry but
little weight for, it is argued, the court is in as good a position
to make the inferences as the referee." Consequently, there
is no good reason why the court may not reverse an order or
finding of the referee merely upon the ground that there was
evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding.3 '
Suppose, however, the question in the above case were raised
in an action to a court and jury by the trustee to recover a
preference? Will the jury be permitted to find a verdict either
way on the issue of insolvency, or will the court direct a verdict of insolvency, or, if a contrary finding is returned, grant
a new trial? If the undisputed or stipulated facts in such a
situation raise a genuine presumption which casts upon the defendant the burden to proceed with evidence, and he fails to
sustain this burden, obviously the jury will be compelled to
find but one way. If, however, the facts create but a "per33
in
34

re Dix, supra note 32 at 1016, 1017.
1n re Malschick & Levin, 206 Fed. 71 (D. C. Pa. 1913); In re Elmore
Cotton Mills, 217 Fed. 810 (D. C. Ala. 1914); Matter of Aronson, 233 Fed.
1022 85(D. C. Ala. 1916).
See GILBERT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 637.
36
Matter of Brayton, 276 Fed. 1020 (D. C. N. Y. 1922); Matter of Solof,
2 Fed. (2d). 130 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924). "But findings based on undisputed facts
which are set out in the record are entitled to no presumptions in their favor.
In re Williams (D. C.)' 120 Fed. 542 (D. C. Ga. 1903); In re Swift, 114
Fed. 947 (D. C. Mass. 1902)." In re Elmore Cotton Mills, 217 Fed. 810, 819
(D. C. Ala. 1914).
37CJ. Matter of Skurat (D. C. Minn.) 7 Am. Bankr, Rep. (N. s.)' 176.
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missible inference," that is, they amount to sufficient evidence
to warrant a verdict of insolvency, the jury's verdict will stand.
This is usually what is described as a prima facie case. The
jury can find and are warranted in finding that there was insolvency, but are not required to do so. There is some evidence of insolvency and the evidence is sufficient to permit a
finding to that effect. If, however, the jury is not convinced,
since the trustee must get an affirmative verdict he must lose
because he has failed to satisfy the burden of proof which
has been on him all the time.
Re Dix does not answer this question. While it is true
that the language used indicates a presumption in the strict
sense, it is equally true that the strict result of the situation is
consistent with what is called a mere warrantable inference.
Since the court in a bankruptcy proceeding may or may not
adopt the findings deduced from facts which are undisputed,
it is obvious that the result in the case under discussion may
not have been one that was necessarily compelled, by virtue of
the presumption. It may be that the court were quite willing
to concede that a finding either way, as to insolvency, was not
an error of law, but, since the court had the power to make its
own findings of fact from undisputed evidence, it chose to find
contrary to the referee.
It seems safest, therefore, to conclude that such circumstances make out for plaintiff trustee but a prima facie case
in the sense that they afford evidence which is sufficient to prove
insolvency, although such a finding is still a question of fact
and is not converted by the presumption and the absence of rebutting evidence into a question of law. It will depend upon
how the question of fact is actually determined whether the
trustee has sustained his burden of proof.'
The transferee or person benefited "s must have reasonable
cause to believe that by taking the property a preference will
3
81n re K. G. Whitfield & Bros., 290 Fed. 596, 600 (D. C. Tenn. 1923), the
court indicated that this inference from the case under discussion is correct.
It was said: "The mere fact, standing alone, that subsequent to the transfer
of property a debtor is adjudged a bankrupt, does not raise the presumption
that he was insolvent at the time of the transfer. In re Chappell, 113 Fed.
545 (D. C. Va. 1901), 7 Am. Bankr. Rep. 608. However, an adjudication
of bankruptcy shortly following the transfer under certain conditions might warrant the presumption. In re Dix, 267 Fed. 1016 (D. C. N. Y. 1920), 46 Am.
Bankr. Rep. 199." Italics added.
39It is sometimes overlooked that the required knowledge which constitutes
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be effected. Before the amendment of 1910 the transferee had
to have reason to believe that the bankrupt intended to prefer
him, but now the question is whether a reasonable man in the
creditor's position would believe that a preference would actually result."0 Here again, the trustee must bear the burden of
proof.4 The presumption favors the defendant by requiring
the inference, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that he
had no such grounds to believe that a preference would result.42
This presumption is such that if two inferences of substantially
equal weight can be drawn from the evidence, that one must be
drawn which will sustain the validity of the payment or transfer.4 In other words, if the evidence is evenly balanced, the
trustee must lose because he has failed to satisfy the onus imposed upon him which was to get an affirmative verdict by convincing the jury or other fact finding organ upon the issue of
reasonable cause. Hence, if the trustee fails to adduce proof
to overcome the creditor's proof that he has no reasonable cause
for suspicion, the court will not permit, as a matter of law, the
conveyance to be defeated.
The trustee must establish insolvency at the time of the
transfer as a prerequisite to showing reasonable cause to believe
that a preference would be effected. Of course, if insolvency
cannot be shown, there can be no reasonable cause for the creditor to believe that he will get more than other creditors of the
same class. " But more is required, still, to furnish reasonable
cause for such belief; the creditor must know about the insolvency or he must have within his knowledge facts sufficient to
charge him with knowledge,,5 for there will be no unlawful
reasonable cause is not necessarily confined to the transfered or person from

whom the preference is sought to be recovered. See 7 C. J. 148, n. 65, (j).
See also 4 REMINGTON, BAN KRUPTCY (3d ed. 1923)" § 1837.
32.

40Cf.
(1927)1 1 DAx. L. REv.
41
Brown v. First State Bank of Weimar, 199 S.W. 895
42
Calhoun County Bank v. Cain, 152 Fed. 983 (C. C.
43

(Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
A. 4th, 1907).
Matter of Gaylord, 225 Fed. 234 (D.C. N. Y. 1915). See GILBERT, op. Cit.

supra note 1, at 864.
44

Wrenn v. Citizen's Nat. Bank, 96 Conn. 374, 114 At. 120 (1921)'. Although
this may degenerate into sophistry, it is of no 6onsequence, since obviously the
trustee could not recover the preference, if there was no insolvency, whether
the debtor could be charged with "reasonable cause to believe" or not.
45
See Deland v. Miller & Cheney Bank, 119 Iowa, 368, 93 N. W. 304 (1903);
Butler Co. v. Goembel, 143 Fed. 295 (C. C. A. 7th, 1905). "As a first and
essential requisite the creditor must have reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor is insolvent. This is necessarily implied in, and must serve as a founda.
tion for, reasonable cause to believe that a preference will result from the transaction. Without this, there can be no cause, within the limits of reason, for
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preference at all if, at the time, the debtor was solvent. 6 But
suppose the trustee can show that the debtor was in fact insolvent at the time of the transfer and that the creditor in fact
knew of such insolvency, or had knowledge of facts sufficient
to put him on inquiry. Wihat is the effect of the concurrence
of these two circumstances?
Before these questions can be answered some general considerations may be profitably summarized.
A given set of circumstances may have several effects so far
as its probative effect is concerned. In the first place, such circumstances may be no evidence whatever, when taken alone,
on the issue of reasonable cause. They have in themselves no
probative effect whatever. Consequently no finding that the
creditor did, in fact, have reasonable cause to believe that a
preference would be effected could be predicated upon such
circumstances. On the other hand, the same circumstances may
be of some evidentiary value and may be of sufficient weight
so that if they are taken with, although they require, some further corroborative proof, they may be sufficient to show reasonable cause. Here, as a matter of law, the burden of proof has
not been sustained by the trustee."
Again, the circumstances may be of such a nature and of
such weight that they will support a finding of reasonable cause,
taken alone and with no other evidence either way. In such
a situation, we have the so-called "prima facie" case, which
means that if the circumstances are not disputed and if there is
no rebutting evidence on the issue of reasonable cause, there
will be no error in a finding either way. "8 Reasonable cause
is here a pure question of fact.
In the next place, the circumstances may carry such weight
as to establish reasonable cause if there is no rebutting evidence introduced by the defendant. A burden to proceed with
proof is thereby thrown upon the defendant which, if he fails
to sustain, will subject him to an adverse ruling by the court.
There is no burden of proof upon the defendant to show an
the creditor to suppose that he is gaining a preference and consequently the
transaction will not be voidable though it does actually result in a preference."
BLAcK,
46 op. cit. supra note 2, at 1311.

Bankruptcy Act, § 60a.
Calhoun County Bank v. Cain, 152 Fed. 983 (C. C. A. 4th, 1907).

47

4SFeilbach Co. v. Russell, 233 Fed. 412 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916).
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) 455, § 2494 (2).

Cf. 5 WiGmoRE,
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absence of reasonable cause, but there is upon him a burden to
offer proof, and this burden has shifted from the trustee to the
creditor.
Still again, the circumstances may be of such weight as to
cast upon the defendant the burden of proving the good faith"
of the transaction by a preponderance of evidence, which means
that he must show 'the existence of grounds for a reasonable
man to base good faith. If he fails to respond with substantial
evidence, there will be required a finding against him." He
is subject to all the penalties and liabilities of the ordinary
party upon whom the burden of proof is imposed. His failure
to offer proof under these circumstances converts a question of
fact into a question of law, and the rule of law is against him
on the issue of reasonable cause.
In the last place, circumstances may, as a matter of law,
amount to reasonable cause to believe that a preference will be
effected. Courts speak of this situation as a "conclusive" presumption of reasonable cause. It means that here the circumstances are reasonable cause, and no further proof either way
is necessary. The circumstances being established, the question of reasonable cause is no longer one of fact, but exclusively a question of law. 1 Any attempt to classify every possible set of circumstances must necessarily fail, if for no other
reason than that the courts are not wanting in ambiguity in
their language. Some situations, however, which are almost
invariably existent in a suit to recover preferences may lend
themselves to analysis.
Prior to 1910, when the creditor was required to have reasonable grounds to believe that a preference was intended, instead of reasonable cause to believe that a preference would
be effected, it was generally held, as a matter of law, that it was
necessary for the debtor himself actually to have had such an
49

"Good faith" here means an absence of "reasonable cause" to believe that

a preference would be effected.

5OQuaere, is defendant's duty, as to producing evidence any greater hero than
in the next preceding set of circumstances? Cf. 5 WMORE, op. cit. supra note
48, at 443, §2487 ,(a).

51See Ogden v. Redish, 200 Fed. 977 (D. C. Ky. 1912). Cf. "preference in
law" with "fraud in law" or "legal fraud"-facts which amount to fraud in
law regardless of the state of mind of the grantor, as in the case of an insolvent debtor making a voluntary conveyance and thus defeating the claims of
existing creditors.

Fluke v. Sharum, 118 Ark. 228, 176 S. W. 684 (1915);

Goodman v. Wineland, 61 Md. 449 (1884); Oliver v. Moore, 23 Ohio St. 473
(1872).
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intent. 2 Under this requirement, the intent on the part of the
debtor was conclusively presumed if the necessary effect of
the transfer was to amount to a preference, 3 or if a preference
actually resulted,' and if, at the time he knew of his own insolvency." So, if a preference actually resulted, the trustee
was relieved of the burden of proof to show that the debtor
had an intent to prefer." The same or a similar rule was applied by some courts to the issue of reasonable cause on the
part of the defendant creditor, so that the net result was that
if the necessary effect of the transfer was to create a preference in fact, the creditor was presumed to have had reasonable
grounds for belief that such intent existed on the part of the
debtor. 7 Consequently, it has been declared that where a creditor knew that the bankrupt was insolvent, and thereupon obtained a preference within four months, he was presumed to
have had reasonable cause to believe that a preference was intended.'"
After the change in the statute requiring reasonable cause,
some courts had no difficulty in arguing upon the analogy of
the foregoing presumption that if the debtor was known to be
insolvent or there were grounds to put a prudent creditor upon
notice, and a preference actually resulted, he was presumed to
have the necessary reasonable grounds to believe that such
would be the result of the transaction." The effect of this presumption was to bring it within the class of conclusive presumptions. In truth, it is not a presumption at all, but a rule of law
which operates to definitely fix reasonable cause. In short, if
the creditor knows of the bankrupt's insolvency and the eventual
result of the transfer is to produce a preference, reasonable
cause in law exists, and there is no question of fact involved.
The requirements of the Act are satisfied."0 Thus, it has been
stated by the Massachusetts court:
"2Hardy v. Gray, 144 Fed. 922 (C. C. A. 1st, 1906) ; In re First Nat. Bank
of Louisville, 155 Fed. 100 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907).
"3See Western Tie & Lumber Co. v. Brown, 196 U. S. 502, 508, 25 Sup. Ct.
339 (1905) ; In re Dorr, 196 Fed. 292 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912).
54 Brewster v. Goff Lumber Co., 164 Fed. 124 (D. C. Pa. 1908).
"sToof v. Martin, 13 Wall. 40 (U. S. 1871).
"eIbid. 48. See WILLISTON, CASES ON BAN"RUPTCY (2d ed. 1913) 255, n. 1.
57Utah Ass'n. of Creditimen v. Boyle Co., 43 Utah, 523, 136 Pac. 572, 574
(1913). See Lazarus v. Eagen, 206 Fed. 518 (D. C. Pa. 1912).
"sCrawford v. Rumpf, 205 Pa. 154, 54 Atil. 709 (1903).
"gHewitt v. Boston Straw Board Co., 214 Mass. 260, 101 N. E. 424 (1913).
"0In Hewitt v. Boston Straw Board Co., supra note 59, the court, in declar-

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

"It is unnecessary to show actual knowledge or belief by
the creditor. If the circumstances are such as would lead the

ordinary prudent man of affairs to the conclusion that his debtor
is insolvent, he obtains a preferential payment within the mean.
ing of the statute, by accepting payment in whole or in part of

the debt, where the transaction takes place within four months
prior to adjudication; and other creditors of the same class,

because of the greater
percentage received, must accept de'61
creased dividends.

Such seems to be the inevitable holding in some of the cases,
but consideration will indicate that this is an irrational conclu-

sion. The section of the Bankruptcy Act under consideration
expressly provides that in order to set aside a transaction as
a preference the debtor must not only be insolvent but the

transferee or person benefited must have reasonable cause to
believe a preference must be effected, which, from the definition
of a preference, implies something more than knowledge of or
reasonable cause to believe the debtor insolvent."

The mere

knowledge, then, of insolvency might not constitute reasonable
ground to believe that there would be a preference, and there

are cases which indicate as much. 3 The defendant creditor

may submit evidence to indicate that, in spite of his knowledge

of insolvency, he believed, with reasonable grounds, that there
would be no preference result.
ing the effect of knowledge of insolvency by the creditor and the actual and
inevitable result of the transfer effecting a preference, declared: "The bankrupt
and the defendant must be presumed to have known that what had been done
resulted in a preference'
Cf. Bryant v. Wolf, 94 Misc. 643, 158 N. Y. Supp.
678 (1916). Cf. re Hoover-McClintock Motor Car Co., 1 Fed. (2d) 660 (D. C.
Tenn. 1924) particularly at page 662, holding, as a matter of law, that a transfer,
within four months by an insolvent, creating a preference is void, if the creditor
knows of the insolvency. See also, Marin v. McDonald Mfg. Co., 159 Minn.
447, 199 N. W. 176 (1924); Hanson v. Shank, 159 Minn. 278, 198 N. W. 804
(1924)'.
61
See Rogers v. American Halibut Co., 216 Mass. 227, 103 N. E. 689, 690

(1913); See

WILLISTON, CASFS ON BANKRUPTCY (2d ed. 1913) 256.
62"If and in so far as such 'reasonable cause to believe' means simply that

they had reasonable cause to believe that Ponzi (the bankrupt) was insolvent, I
find that they did have such reasonable cause to believe.
"... But the statute requires more than reasonable cause to believe that
Ponzi was insolvent. It requires reasonable cause to believe that such payments
'would effect a preference'; that is, that 'the effect of the payments' will be to
enable any one of his creditors to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
any other of such creditors of the same class." Anderson, C. J.,in Lowell v.
Brown, 280 Fed. 193, 203 (D. C. Mass. 1922).
OsKennard v. Behrer, 270 Fed. 661 (D. C. N. Y. 1920); Lowell v. Brown, 280
Fed. 193 (D. C. Mass. 1922); cf. also Kimmerle v. Farr, 189 Fed. 295 (C. C. A.
6th, 1911)'.
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In Kennard v. Behrer,4 Judge Hand made this distinction
and explained it lucidly. "The act of March 2, .1867 (14 Stat.
534, 35), was differently worded; it made the test reasonable
cause to believe the bankrupt insolvent. The present act, up
to 1910, made the test reasonable cause to believe that the bankrupt intended to effect a preference. Under this statute it was
decided that the bankrupt's knowledge that he was insolvent was
not equivalent to an intent to create a preference. . . . It was
recognized that in spite of the fact of insolvency the bankrupt
might honestly suppose that he could in the end pay them all,
and indeed that the creditor might share his belief. Now that
the statute is changed, and intent to prefer gives place to belief that a preference will result, the rule is the same. If the
bankrupt's honest judgment that he could pay in full protected
the creditor then, the creditor's honest judgment to the same
effect will protect him now. The change from the act of 1867
was certainly with a purpose which can be fulfilled only if the
distinction which I mention is observed."6"
•.Accordingly, the rule of Kehnard v. Behrer is to be understood as meaning that although the debtor was insolvent at the
time the security or payment is given, and although the creditor
knew that he was insolvent at the time, yet if the parties honestly believe upon reasonable grounds that some of the assets,
worthless at the time, would, if the debtor is allowed to continue
business, realize enough to pay all debts in full, there has been
no preference; the creditor not having reasonable grounds to
believe that a preference would be effected.
There is no doubt of the soundness of this reasoning, and in
the light of the result thereof, there is no doubt of the fallacy
in holding, as matter of law, that knowledge of insolvency
amounts to reasonable cause. The presumption, however, can
be modified to conform to the rule enunciated by Judge Hand
in Kennard v. Behrer, supra. If the debtor knew or had reasonable cause to know of the debtor's insolvency when he took
the preference, and if the result of the transfer was to necessarily produce a preference, there exists in law reasonable cause
64270 Fed. 661 (D.C. N. Y. 1920).
65Ibid. at 664. In Hardy v. Gray, supra note 52, it was held that something

more than knowledge of insolvency was necessary to establish intent to prefer on
the part of the debtor. In Kimmerle v. Farr, supra note 63, something more than
knowledge of insolvency was necessary to establish reasonable cause on the part

of the creditor.
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to believe such would result. This means that the creditor could
have no reasonable* cause to hope that the insolvent debtor
might subsequently retrieve his fortunes and pay all his creditors. The test, however, is not whether a preference actually
results, but whether there were any grounds to believe and an
actual belief that a preference would be avoided. When the
trustee has proven the insolvency of the debtor and knowledge
on the part of the creditor, the burden of proof is undoubtedly
on the creditor to prove that he had an honest belief based upon
reasonable grounds that the other creditors would lose nothing
by the transaction.66
If summarized, then, the presumptions discussed above
should be resolved into some such proposition as the following:
Where the bankrupt is distinctly insolvent at the time of the
adjudication in bankruptcy, in a subsequent action by the
trustee in bankruptcy to recover a preference there is a warrantable inference (but not a compulsory one) that he was insolvent at the time of the transfer if the same was made within
the next preceding four months from the petition in bankruptcy.
Where this is the situation, a presumption arises which demands, as a matter of law, a finding that the creditor had reasonable grounds to believe that a preference would be effected,.
if it can be shown that the creditor at the time either had knowledge of the insolvency or had knowledge of facts sufficient to
put a reasonable man upon notice, unless the creditor can show
that he had grounds to believe, as a reasonable man, that the
other creditors would get as much in payment of their claims.
All the other elements being present, the burden of proof, of
course, is upon the creditor to show the latter situation.
The question is now presented whether there is any presumption to aid the trustee in showing knowledge on the part
of the creditor of insolvency. While circumstantial evidence
may be sufficient to satisfy the burden imposed upon the trustee
to show such knowledge, the circumstances must be more than
merely suspicious or colorable." Circumstances sufficient to
create a suspicion or fear of insolvency are sufficient to charge
66We may say that the presumption against defendant becomes conclusive

if he fails to offer substantial proof of facts to reasonably justify an honest
belief.
67
First Nat. Bank v. Abbott, 165 Fed. 852 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909); Nichols v.
Elken, 225 Fed. 689 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); Roseman v. Coppard, 228 Fed. 114
(C. C. A. 5th, 1916).
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a creditor with notice."8 "The arousing of suspicion as to
keeping faith," it has been said, "which might lead to such investigation as would show knowledge of insolvency, is not equivalent to the knowledge of facts which of themselves would indicate that a preference was actually being given." 69 And mere
proof that an alleged preferred creditor of a bankrupt had
knowledge at the time of the preference that the bankrupt was
unable to pay the creditor's debt was insufficient to charge the
creditor.7 0
There seems to be no rule or concrete test to designate exactly what, in 'a given case, shall put the creditor on notice.
The ordinary standards are applicable. If there are no facts
shown to have been within the creditor's knowledge which a
reasonable man might find sufficient to put him on inquiry, the
case should not go to the jury at all." There should be a directed verdict for the defendant. 2 If the facts shown to have
been known to the defendant at the time of the transfer were
such that reasonable men might find, but would not necessarily
be compelled to find sufficient to put an ordinary prudent man
upon inquiry as to solvency, there is a jury question and the
68
Arthur v. Harrington, 211 Fed. 215 (D. C. N. Y. 1914). In considering
the effect of proof of circumstances tending to show reasonable cause, cf. the
following: "There are different degrees of knowledge which it is possible for
the preferred creditor to have. He may know that the debtor is insolvent and
that the transfer to him covers a greater percentage of his property than he is
entitled to, and hence that it effects a preference. . . .Then comes, not such
knowledge, but knowledge of that, the reasonable effect of knowing which is belief
to that effect. This degree of knowledge is called for in so many words. Then
comes knowledge of that, the reasonable effect of knowing which is not such
belief, but only a fear or suspicion that such is the case. Such a degree of
knowledge is certainly not within the statute.
"... If the degree of knowledge is such as to engender fear that such is
the case, so strong that the preferred creditor refrains from availing himself of
the means at his hand for ascertaining the truth, in order to keep himself in
the dark in regard thereto, and to be in position to claim that he did not have
reasonable cause to believe that the transfer to him would work a preference,
the case is covered by the statute." Cochran, J., in Ogden v. Reddish, 200 Fed.
977, 988 (D. C. Ky. 1912).
69
Markeim v. Hurley, 197 Fed. 183, 185 (D. C. N. Y. 1912).
7OAndrews v. Kellogg, 41 Colo. 35, 92 Pac. 222 (1907). The fact that the
bankrupt's notes frequently went to protest is not sufficient to put the holder on inquiry to charge him with notice of insolvency. Re Thomas Deutschle & Co.,
182 Fed. 435 (D. C. Pa. 1910). But see Conners v. Bucksport Nat. Bank, 214
Fed. 847 (D. C. Me. 1914), also 216 Fed. 990 (C. C. A. 9th, 1914).
71
According to the general rule. See Summit Coal Co. v. Raleigh Smokeless Fuel Co., 99 W. Va. 11, 128 S. E. 298 (1925).
721f the case is not tried to a jury, the same standards, of course, apply.
The point is that there is a question of law, under such circumstances, with a
rule of law to determine it.
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verdict will be upheld whether for the trustee or for the creditor.7" But if the facts shown to have been within the creditor's
knowledge at the time were of such a nature that it can be said
no reasonable man could fail to be put upon inquiry, the case
should never go to the jury, because if a verdict for defendant
should be returned, the court would necessarily be obligated
to grant a new trial. Under such circumstances,
of course, there
7'
will be a directed verdict for the trustee.
There may still be other circumstances tending to reduce
the onus imposed upon the trustee to prove reasonable cause.
Sometimes they are described in a different way, and their
effect evaluated from a different point of view. Thus it is said
that while the burden of proof is always on the trustee to show
the elements of a preference, the circumstances of the case may
be such as to be of vital importance in determining the question
whether that burden has been sustained."' Before the 1910
amendment, it was urged that the circumstances that the creditor
was a near relative makes a "prima facie" case for the trustee,
and that the burden "to prove by satisfactory evidence" that
the transaction was in good faith is upon the creditor. '
But this case was decided when the trustee was required to
show an intent by the debtor and reasonable cause to believe
that such an intent existed on the part of the creditor. Does
the fact of relationship have any effect under the present law?
It is difficult to understand how any presumption is raised by
such circumstances. Since the intent of the debtor is of no
consequence, 7 lack of good faith is no element in the trustee's
case.
If there is a question of collusion, the transfer may be
73

Since the proposition is a doubtful one, it is necessarily a question of

fact, and for the jury, if there be one. Whether there is any evidence to sustain a finding, is a question of law for the court; whether there is sufficient
evidence to warrant a verdict, is for the jury to say. Davis v. Hill, 272 S. W.
292 (Tex. 1925).
74If facts are undisputed or if they are admitted by defendant, and the same
are susceptible of but one interpretation, namely, as being sufficient to charge

the creditor with knowledge of insolvency, and if this, coupled with other facts,
presents what amounts to reasonable grounds for belief that the transfer would
effect a preference, the court will direct a verdict for trustee. Cf. Hanson v.
Shank, 159 Minn. 326, 198 N. W. 804 (1924); Shale v. Farmers Bank, 82 Kan.
649, 75
109 Pac. 408 (1910).

See 4 REMIrNGT6N, BANKRUPTCY (3d ed. 1923) §1829.
6Re Sanger, 169 Fed. 722 (D. C. W. Va. 1909). See also GILBRT, op, cit.

7

supra note 1, at 864.
77

Soule v. First Nat. Bank of Ashton, 26 Idaho, 66, 140 Pac. 1098 (1914).
Except in so far as good faith means an absence of reasonable cause, but
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a fraudulent one. Thus the factor of relationship between the
parties is important respecting their good faith and raises pre-

sumptions in the trustee's favor when he is seeking to set aside
a transfer of property on the ground that it constitutes a fraudulent conveyance."5 Preferences, however, are not attacked on
the grounds of either actual or legal fraud, but entirely upon
the ground that an equitable distribution of assets of an insol-

vent debtor is demanded from the point of view of policy. The
debtor has reserved no benefit to himself when he makes a

preferential payment.

The effect of the prohibition against

preference is largely to remove the premium which the law has

immemoriably placed upon "diligence" in the creditor, with
a generous substitution of equitable principles in its stead."0
In a suit brought by a creditor's bill to recover property
conveyed to a wife to secure a pre-existing indebtedness, it has
if the creditor had reasonable cause to believe that a preference would be effected and that the debtor was insolvent, it is not necessary that the debtor
should have intended a preference or that the creditor should have cause to
believe that such intention existed. See Covington v. Brigman, 210 Fed. 499
(D. C. N. C. 1914); Brigman v. Covington, 219 Fed. 500 (C. C. A. 4th, 1915).
79The courts are not agreed upon the precise effect of such presumptions.
It has been declared that no clearer proof of bona fides is required as between
relatives than as between any other vendor and vendee. Teague v. Lindsey, 106
Ala. 260, 17 So. 538 (1894), but cf. Lehman, Durr & Co. v. Graunbutt, 88 Ala.
478, 7 So. 299 (1889). Here, of course, no presumpion is raised by virtue of.
blood kinship. See Martin v. Fox, 40 Mo. App. 664 (1890). Under this ruling,
relationship alone would not be sufficient evidence of fraud to support a finding
to that effect. Adams v. Ryan, 61 Iowa, 733, 17 N. W. 159 (1883); Klein v.
Gallin, 136 App. Div. 382, 120 N. Y. Supp. 1036 (1910). The mere fact that a
transaction was between members of the family, has been said not to warrant a
presumption of fraud. Steinfort v. Langbout, 170 Iowa, 422, 152 N. W. 612
(1915) ; State Bank of Woolstock v. Schutt, 174 Iowa, 583, 156 N. W. 762
(1916).
But it is otherwise if the debtor is embarrassed or insolvent. The burden
of proof is then on the parties to show good faith. Treadwell v. Graham, 88
N. C. 308 (1883). Also as between husband and wife, a voluntary conveyance
by an insolvent debtor throws the burden upon the parties to uphold the transaction. McConnell v. Hopkins, 86 Ark. 225, 110 S.W. 1039 (1908); Gray v.
Collins, 139 Ga. 776, 78 S.E. 127 (1913); Tucker v. Weatherbee, 98 S.C. 402,
82 S.E. 638 (1914). So also as to transactions between brother and sister.
McDonough v. McGowan, 165 Ky. 425, 177 S.W. 277 (1915).
The following summary has been made: Conveyances to near relations of an
embarrassed debtor are looked upon with suspicion, presumed fraudulent when
voluntary, and conclusively presumed fraudulent as to existing creditors when
the debtor's embarrassment proceeds to financial wreck. Papan v. Nahay, 106
Ark. 230, 152 S.W. 107 (1913).
s 0"Under the Bankruptcy Act, preferences may be set aside by the trustee
on the theory that equality between the creditors of the same class is equity; that
it is better administration of justice that there should be such equality than that
a favored few, even though they may be diligent, should receive the lion's share
of the estate." Goetz v. Zeif, 181 Wis. 628, 195 N. W. 874, 879 (1923).
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been declared that, except as prohibited by the Bankruptcy Act,
a husband may prefer his wife as a creditor in the absence of
actual or constructive fraud to which she is a party, and, although such transactions are subject to the keenest scrutiny
they are not ipso facto illegal.8' From this it is deduced that
so far as an unlawful preference is concerned, a transaction
between relatives or between husband and wife presents no
different problem than does a transaction between any other
parties. It seems, however, that the relation of the parties,
their intimacy or lack of it, the usual or unusual nature of the
transfer and the opportunities of the creditor for knowledge
are all facts which may be properly considered as circumstantial evidence, to be given such weight as they may merit, in
determining reasonable cause within the meaning of the
statute. 2 This is far different, however, from facts sufficient
to raise a presumption in law, with its corresponding effect upon
the trustee's burden of proof.8 3
In considering the effect of the various types of presumption arising under the section of the Bankruptcy Act providing
for avoidance of preferences by the trustee, there seem to be
several reasons for the confusion that exists. In the first place,
the courts frequently employ language which suggests the old
law of requiring an intent on the part of the debtor and reasonable cause for believing the same by the creditor. 4 This introduces the element of good faith in the sense of purpose. If
good faith has any place in the law of preferences as it now
exists, it must be confined to knowledge of the effect of the
transfer, irrespective of the purpose of either the debtor or the
creditor. If this is all it means, there is no advantage in using
the expression at all, and it had better be confined to the law
of fraudulent conveyances where it more properly belongs.
Again, no little ambiguity results from failing to distin8

sWeld v. McKay, 218 Fed. 807 (C. C. A. 7th, 1914).

It seems that there

was a presumption against such a transfer, but whether it was on the ground

of preference
or fraudulent conveyance is not clear.
82

No authority is cited.

Goetz v. Zeif, 181 Wis. 628, 195 N. W. 874 (1923).
8 1n Watson v. Adams, 242 Fed. 441, 444 (C. C. A. 6th, 1917), the court,
3

in referring to a transfer by a debtor, while insolvent, to his mother and sister,
declared:

".

.

. the inference that they knew (had reasonable cause, etc.) they

would get their pay, while others would fare worse, rests only on suspicion-an
insufficient foundation.

The decree . . . must be reversed, and the court below

instructed to dismiss the petition.'
84Cf. discussion in Wolf Mfg . Co. v. Battreal Shoe Co., 192 Mo. App. 113,
180 S.W. 396, 399 (1915).
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guish between evidence of insolvency and evidence of reasonable cause. One gets the impression from some of the cases
that evidence of one is evidence of the other and that what
establishes the one will be sufficient to prove the other. It is
common for courts to declare that payments by an insolvent
debtor are not recoverable as preferences unless the payee had
actual or constructive notice of the debtor's insolvency when
they were made,"5 or to say that it is not necessary that the
creditor actually knew that the debtor was insolvent, but the
preference is void if he had information sufficient to have put
an ordinary business man on inquiry. 6 The inference that if
insolvency is known or if grounds for such knowledge are present, the transfer is voidable, does not, as we have seen, necessarily follow. Thus, unless analysis of the exact gradations of
proof is insisted upon and the clear-cut effect of such presumptions as are raised definitely distinguished, the matter of proving the various elements of a preference is fraught with numerous pitfalls.
In one of the most frequently cited cases,s" the court intimates by numerous dicta that reasonable cause to believe that
the debtor is insolvent amounts to reasonable cause to believe
that there would be a preference, apparently ignoring the fact,
not uncommon in modern business, that a creditor might actually know of his debtor's insolvency and still have reasonable
grounds to believe that there would be no preference in the
end. The headnote to the case indicates the fallacy: ". . . the
creditor must have reasonable cause to believe that the financial
condition of the debtor at the time when the transfer was made
was such that the security when enforced would work a preference; i.e., that the debtor was then insolvent."
Finally, as usual, great confusion results from the customary use by the courts of the expressions "presumptions," "prima
face case," and "burden of proof" in several different senses.
This ambiguity is not confined to bankruptcy law, but it greatly
confuses the law relating to preferences. We have seen that
there are three common meanings attached to the first expres85

Scott County Milling Co. v. Powers, 112 Miss. 798, 73 So. 792 (1916).

s8 Courts too often assume that if the creditor is chargeable with knowledge
of insolvency, he is therefore chargeable with "reasonable cause." Cf. Capital
Nat. Bank v. Wilkerson, 36 Ind. App. 467, 72 N. E. 247, 249 (1904).
8TSee In re Gaylord, 225 Fed. 234 (D. C. N. Y. 1915).
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sion excluding the "conclusive presumption," three meanings
to the second expression," and two meanings involved in the
third. It is necessary to go carefully into the language of many
opinions to find which meaning is intended, only to find that
the results of the case, on the pleadings, indicates that the effect
accorded to the presumption is entirely inconsistent with the
explanation given. Consequently, it is not uncommon for both
courts and attorneys to cite cases involving presumptions of
one kind as authority for invoking one which produces an entirely different effect. Thus every case in which a trustee recovers a preference requires close analysis to determine the
extent of the advantage to the trustee in utilizing the presumptions arising from the circumstantial evidence which, in so many
situations, is all that he can depend upon to establish his case.
ssWigmore comments upon the two meanings of "prima facie" case.
5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) 455 §2494.

See

